MMK 18: Ātmaparīkṣā · Oct 23, 11:12 AM by Kukkurovaca
18:1

ātmā skandhā yadi bhavedudayavyayabhāgbhavet|

skandhebhyo ‘nyo yadi bhavedbhavedaskandhalakṣaṇaḥ||1

If the self were the skandhas, it would participate in coming about and passing away.

If it were other than the skandhas, it would not be characterized by them1.
18:2

ātmanyasati cātmīyaṃ kuta eva bhaviṣyati|

nirmamo nirahaṃkāraḥ śamādātmātmanīnayoḥ||2

In the absence of the self, how will there be something related to the self?

Because of the pacification of the self and what relates to it, (one) is devoid of egotism, devoid of posessiveness2.
18:3

nirmamo nirahaṃkāro yaśca so ‘pi na vidyate|

nirmamaṃ nirahaṃkāraṃ yaḥ paśyati na paśyati||3

(However?), he who is devoid of egotism, devoid of posessivenessis not found.

Who sees one devoid of egotism, devoid of posessiveness does not see3.
18:4

mametyahamiti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmameva ca|

nirudhyata upādānaṃ tatkṣayājjanmanaḥ kṣayaḥ||4

If there is eradication of “I” and “My” within and without oneself,

Grasping is ceased. Because of that destruction, there is destruction of (re)birth4.
18:5

karmakleśakṣayānmokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ|

te prapañcātprapañcastu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate||5

Because of the destruction of the defilements of action, there is liberation. The defilements of action come from the imagination.

They come from metastasis, but metastasis ceases in emptiness5.
18:6

ātmetyapi prajñapitamanātmetyapi deśitam|

buddhairnātmā na cānātmā kaścidityapi deśitam||6

Although a “self” has been disclosed, although “not self” has been taught,

No self or nonself whatsoever has been taught by the Buddha6.
18:7

nivṛttamabhidhātavyaṃ nivṛtte cittagocare|

anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā||7

The designable is ceased when the range of thought is ceased,

for phenomenality is like nirvana, unarisen and unstopped7.
18:8

sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyameva ca|

naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyametadbuddhānuśāsanaṃ||8

All is true, or not true, true and not true,

or neither true nor not true; this is the instruction of the Buddha8.
18:9

aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcairaprapañcitaṃ|

nirvikalpamanānārthametattattvasya lakṣaṇam||9

Not dependent on some other thing, pacified, not metastasized by metastasis,

Unimagined, not aimed at multiplicity, this is the mark of reality9.
18:10

pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat|

na cānyadapi tattasmāna noccinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ||10

Whatsoever becomes (which is) dependent, that, insofar, is not only that.

Neither is it other (than that). Therefore, it is not annihilated, but neither is it eternal10.
18:11

anekārthamanānarthamanucchedamaśāśvatamcedamaśāśvatam|

etattallokaṇathānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtaṃ||11

Not aimed at one (not monistic), not aimed at many (not pluralistic), not annihilationist, not eternalist,

This is the undying instruction of the Buddhas, world-lords11.
18:12

saṃbuddhānām anutpāde śrāvakāṇāṃ punaḥ kṣaye|

jñānaṃ pratyekabuddhānāmasaṃsargātpravartate||12

When full Buddhas do not arise, when the students perish,

The knowledge of the independent Buddhas comes forth from isolation12.
Notes

1

ātman(m1s) skandha(m1p) yadi (ind) bhū (ActOptSing) udayavyayabhaj(m1s)

skandha(m5p) anya(m1s) yadi(ind) bhū (ActOptSing) bhū (ActOptSing) askandhalakṣaṇa(m1s)

The first verse poses the question of whether or not the skandhas are an adequate device for accounting for the appearance of the self. Traditionally in Buddhism the human subject was accounted for by a reductionistic psychology based on the skandhas; Nāgārjuna upholds the rejection of a substantial self, but also attacks the ascription of ultimate reality to constituent parts by the abhidharma and/or its interpreters.

One of the classic Buddhist metaphors for self is a chariot: if you take a chariot apart, you have some wheels, an axle, possibly some planks or somesuch. But you do not, any longer, have a chariot: a chariot is nothing but a conventional name for a set of parts working together.

But of course, it doesn’t stop here, because a wheel can also be broken down, etc.

2

3

ātman(m7s) asat(m7s) ca(ind) ātmīya(n1s) kutas(ind) eva(ind) bhū(ActFutSing)

nirmama(m1s) nirahaṃkāra(m1s) śama(m5s) ātmātmanīna(m6d)

nirmama(m1s) nirahaṃkāra(m1s) yad(m1s) ca(ind) tad(m1s) api(ind) na(ind) vid(PrePasSing)

nirmama(m2s) nirahaṃkāra(m2s) yad dṛś(PreActSing) na(ind) dṛś(PreActSing)

Verse two introduces a proposition about the consequences of the doctrine of anātman: first, that the absence of a self indicates the absence of self-based relations, and, second, that the pacification of the self and of what relates to the self will lead to a person being devoid of egotism and possessiveness. The practitioner in question is not specified in this verse, but is implicit, since “nirmamaḥ” and “nirahaṃkāra” are adjectives and imply some subject of an also implied existential verb.

Verse three problematizes the second verse, which, using an implicit subject, suggested that one who has “pacified” the self is free of the vices pertaining to it (i.e, egotism and possessiveness), by introducing an explicit subject (“yaH…saH”) which is then rejected; this subject is the substantive to which the adjectives in verse two point. The idea here is that it is incorrect to think that the goal of pacifying the self and what relates to the self is that one will attain for oneself a condition of being without egotism or possessiveness, since this supposes some person, some self, which is somehow supposed to be capable of being without self. Such a person does not exist, and anyone who thinks he sees such a person is incorrect.

I use Kalupahana’s “found” for “vid”; this is appropriate inasmuch as “vid” is etymologically related to our “find”, and carries some of the same connotations. However, Kalupahana may go too far when he uses this word as evidence that Nāgārjuna’s claims are empirical in nature—which is not to say I necessarily deny that the latter is the case. It might be less loaded to see “does not exist”, or “does not occur,” but these also are rich with metaphysical baggage.

4

5

mama(6s) iti(ind) aham(1s) iti(ind) kṣīṇa(m7s) bahirdhā(ind) adhyātma(n1s) eva(ind) ca(ind)

ni-rudh(PastPassSing3rd) upādāna(n1s) tat(n1s) kṣaya(m5s) janman(m6s) kṣaya(m1s)

Verses four and five discuss the liberatory process more explicitly; four specifies that for the grasping which binds one to saṃsāra to disappear, “I” and “my” must disappear both internally and externally. It is perhaps worth noting that Nāgārjuna uses “atmā iti” and “mama iti”, iti being equivalent to quotation marks in modern English, suggesting the practice of saying or thinking “I” and “My” rather than the more abstract concepts of egotism and possessivness suggested by “nirmama” and “ahaṃkāra”.

Also, the caveat “externally, and within oneself” may be meant to suggest a deeper level of rejection of the self than is practiced by those who think of themselves as being devoid of egotism and possessiveness.

Verse five deals with the elimination of the defilements of action, that is to say, “bad karma.” Karma is intimately associated with the self because, especially according to Nāgārjuna’s analysis, action is inextricable from the agent. Karma seems to imply some person who commits actions, but verse five states that the defilements of action are imaginary in origin and arise from prapañca, which ceases in emptiness. That is to say, from the standpoint of reality, such defilements can never arise in the first place. So, there is no existing agent which has to be destroyed (I have not yet decided whether this should be read together with verse one’s comment on participating in arising and passing away) in order for a person to be freed.

6

ātman(m1s) iti(ind) api(ind) prajñapita(m2s) anātman(m1s) iti(ind) api(ind) deśita(m2s)

buddha(m3p) na(ind) ātman(m1s) na(ind) ca(ind) anātman(m1s) kim(m1s) cid(ind) iti(ind) api(ind) deśita(m2s)

Verse six makes clear how to integrate these arguments with traditional teachings—it acknowledges that the Buddha taught “anAtman” (quoted with “iti”) and discussed “Atman” (again quotes with “iti”) (“praj~napitam” means “caused to be known,” and means more or less “taught,” but it has less intensity than “deShitam”, and in particular, I think, implies less commitment on the part of the one instructing. Cf. other uses in MMK), but taught no Atman or anAtman (not quoted with “iti”, i.e., really as opposed to tentatively or for the purpose of discussion) whatsoever. The whatsoever is interesting here; the Sanskrit is (before Sandhi) “kaH cit”, kaH corresponding to “saH” and “yaH”; i.e., “There is no thing whatsoever which was an Atman or anAtman taught by the Buddha.” I.e., the Buddha used these words but his followers should think because of this that he meant they referred to anything. (This idea that words may be used in an informative way without referring to real things may have some interesting correspondences in Chuang-tzu.)

7

nivṛtta(n1s) abhidhātavya(n1s) nivṛtta(n7s) cittagocara(n7s)

anutpannāniruddhā(f1s) hi(ind) nirvāṇa(n2s) iva(ind) dharmatā(f1s)

Verse seven expands upon this point; the designable, i.e., what can be called (designated) something else, ceases with the operations of the mind, i.e., the relationship between terms like “Atman” and “anAtman” and something to which they might point is a nominal/mental artifact with no ultimacy. (Possibly cf. the first chapter of the Daodejing, but conversely possibly not. At any rate, obviously the Boodberg translation would be meant.) NAgArjuna supports this claim by appealing to the similarity of phenomenality (“dharmatA”, an abstract from “dharma” in the sense of “phenomenal constituent”; a more commonsense translation might be “the nature of events,” but I’m wary of the term “nature” given some of the ground NAgArjuna covers, and “eventhood,” which is more literally correct, sounds even sillier than “phenomenality”) to nirvANa. That is, at heart everyday events are characterized by the illimitability and unspecifiability of nirvANa (I’m drawing here partly on McCagney’s account of shUnyatA), i.e., if they are empty. This reflects the use of shUnyatA in verse five and foreshadows NAgArjuna’s radical attack on the division of nirvANa and saMsAra in chapter twenty-five.

8

sarva(n1s) tathya(n1s) na(ind) vā(ind) tathya(n1s) tathya(n1s) ca(ind) atathya(n1s) eva(ind) ca(ind)|

na(ind) eva(ind) atathya(n1s) na(ind) eva(ind) tathya(n1s) etad(n1s) buddhānuśāsana(n1s)

Verse eight restates the catuShkoTi, which is a logical principle somewhat similar to the Western principle of the excluded middle, stipulating certain limits on the range of coherent possible statements. Verse nine offers some qualities of the “mark of reality”, which seems to offer further criteria not just for possibly viable statements but for true ones.

9

aparapratyaya(n1s) śānta(n1s) prapañca(m3p) aprapañcita(n1s)|

nirvikalpa(n1s) anānārtha(n1s) etad(n1s) tattva(m6s) lakṣaṇa(n1s)||9

Here Nāgārjuna is describing the attributes of what is real, as opposed to what is not. “The mark of reality” here is tattvasya lakṣanam, literally the mark or characteristic of “thatness.” What is real does not depend on anything else, it is peaceful, and is “prapañcair aprapañcita”—what I have translated as “not metastasized by metastasis,” which is a very silly way of doing it. However, prapañca, which is usually translated as “delusion” or something like it, really means something more like multiplication. In India, the idea of going from one to many is not usually a highly regarded one, and prapañca reflects this. “Metastasis” is the closest I could get in translating prapañca as “the unchecked spread of something bad.” Really, though, I’m relying on an under-utilized translatory principle: when there’s no adequate word in the destination language, make sure you don’t use one that seems adequate, or you’ll make your readers think they understand more than they do, or more clearly. Also, while it’s difficult, I try to translate a term consistently throughout, especially if it’s a technical term, which prapañca is. McCagney, for example, has “not constructed by means of false imaginings,” which isn’t bad, except that it gives the reader no sense that the two words are from the same root.

Nāgārjuna continues: Reality is not imagined (“made up” might be a better translation here), and “a-nāna-artha” (not having many or multiplicity as its goal). This last is interesting, because it perhaps harkens back to a principle set forth in one of the earliest Buddhist texts (I believe the Rhinoceros Sutra) that “truth is one, not two.” Now, certainly it is in line with Buddhist views to say truth is not two, or, as Nāgārjuna says, not many. However, many versions of Buddhism are not monistic, either—that is, they would not be expected to point at a “one” any more than at a “many.” (Nāgārjuna makes this point in Verse 11.) However, if you look at the context of the statement that truth is one, not two, it is made in the context of refuting the views of a group of thinkers who do not agree amongst themselves; i.e., it is a piece of negative criticism rather than a piece of doctrine laid out positively. Something similar may be at work here.

10

pratītya(ind) yadyad(ind) bhū(PreActSing3rd) na(ind) hi(ind) tāvat(ind) tad(n1s) eva(ind) tad(n1s)

na(ind) ca(ind) anyad(ind) api(ind) tad(n1s) tad(5s) na(ind) uccinna(n1s) na(ind) api(ind) śāśvata(n1s)

Note: If “pratītya yad” is correct, then I believe “pratītya” to be a gerundive here, but I am not 100% sure about this. If not, I suppose we would have to make some kind of compound.

Verse ten brings the discussion of self back to the basic principle of dependent origination, claiming that a dependently arisen thing is neither self-identical nor different from itself, (implying the fourth position of the catuShkoTi), and therefore is not eternalistic or nihilistic, i.e., dependent origination provides a logically possible solution to the problem of identity without the negative consequences of eternalism or nihilism.

11

anekārtha(n1s) anānartha(n1s) anucceda(n1s) aśāśvata(n1s)

etad(n1s) tad(n1s) lokaṇātha(m6p) buddha(m6p) śāsanāmṛta(n1s)

Verse eleven reaffirms the rejection of eternalism and nihilism and joins to a rejection of an orientation toward either one or many. This may constitute a rejection of both metaphysical monism, an assertion of the ultimate reality of the One, and metaphysical pluralism, an assertion of the ultimate reality of the Many, the latter being the position of most well-understood Western theories of physics and also of some of NAgArjuna’s Buddhist interlocutors. This may connect back to the initial question, posed in verse one, of whether the self is or is not merely the skandhas—i.e., whether the self is a thing unto itself, a One, or whether it is a thing constructed of constituent parts, a Many. For NAgArjuna, the process of dependent origination obviates both an monistic and an atomistic interpretation of the human person.

12

sambuddha(m6p) anutpāda(m7s) śrāvaka(m6p) punar(ind) kṣaya(m7s)|

jñāna(n1s) pratyekabuddha(m6p) asaṃsarga(m5s) pra-vṛt(PreMidSing3rd)

Interestingly, NAgArjuna closes with an appeal to the independence of the Solitary Buddhas’ authority—perhaps suggesting that he recognizes a discontinuity between some point of his philosophy presented in this chapter and the traditional lineages of doctrine, and attempts to short-circuit lineage by an assertion of the universal availability of the truth to experience as evidenced in the possibility of the pratyekabuddhas’ enlightenment without a sa~Ngha. Or perhaps he is simply qualifying his assertion in verse eleven of the “immortality” of the Buddhas’ teachings, making clear that he does not mean that they are immortal becaue of some special power of their own or that an immortality of the lineage of teachers is implied.

Note: McCagney (p. 183) has “saṃbuddha”; Kalupahana (p. 274) has “sambuddha.” I was only able to locate “sambuddha” in Monier-Williams (p. 1178:A).